Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 12 | Issue 4

Article 10

5-1-1937

Book Reviews
Anthony W. Brick
James H. Levi
A. R. Martin
Arthur C. Gregory

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Anthony W. Brick, James H. Levi, A. R. Martin & Arthur C. Gregory, Book Reviews, 12 Notre Dame L. Rev. 467 (1937).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol12/iss4/10

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

BOOK REVIEWS
The common-law rule has been generally abrogated or modified by statutes,
both in England and in this country. The general tenor of the statutes is that
a devise will operate on such real estate as the testator was entitled to devise
at the time of his decease, and which he intended to devise, whether it is property that he acquired after making the devise or is property of which he was
owner when he made the deie and afterwards sold, repurchased, and died
seized. In re Estate of Hopper, 66 Cal. 80, 4 Pac. 984 (1884). Under the Wills
Act of 1837 in England and similar statutes in this country, a conveyance of
lands after a devise of them operates to revoke the devise, if the title to the
land remains out of the devisor at the time of his death. See Woolery v. Woolery, 48 Ind. 523, 526 (1874). Generally, however, under such statutes all that
is necessary is that the devisor shall, at the time of his death, be seized of substantially the same estate as that of which he was seized at the time he executed
a devise thereof, in order that the devise operate to pass the same to the devisee.
Woolery v. Woolery, supra.
In the case of Philtippe v. Clevenger, 239 Ill. 117, 87 N. E. 858, 16 Ann. Cas.
207 (1909), it was held that no will could be revoked other than by cancellation,
tearing, or obliterating, or by some other will, and that a specific devise of land
was revoked by a subsequent conveyance of that land to the devisee, and the
devise was not revived by the subsequent reconveyance to the devisor, where
there was no subsequent republication of the will. The rule that a subsequent
conveyance revokes a prior devise has been applied in Illinois only in cases where
the devise was a specific devise. In Strang v. Day -there was a general devise
and it was held to have passed land which was conveyed to the devisee after
making the will and which was subsequently reconveyed to the testator.
As early as 1842 the Supreme Court of Illinois, under a statute providing
that a testator should have power to devise "all the estate, right, title, and
interest . . . which he hath, or at the time of his death shall have, of, in, and
to any lands," held that a devise would operate on after acquired lands, if the
testator so intended. Willis v. Watson, 4 Scam. 64 (1842). A republication of
the will, upon acquisition of after-acquired lands which the will purported to
devise, was held to be unnecessary. Notwithstanding the provisions of this
Statute, Phillippe v. Clevenger held that a conveyance of lands specifically
devised operates to revoke the devise, and if the lands are subsequently reacquired they will not pass under the specific devise if the will is not republished.
But in Strang v. Day the court distinguished this case, saying that it dealt
with a specific devise, while in Strang v. Day there was a general devise, and
the testator intended to pass the after acquired lands under it, even though he
had conveyed the same lands after he had executed his will.
James R. Burke.
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LAw. By Charles W. Gerstenberg.

New York:

Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1937.
A book on Constitutional Law is always timely, even though in the future
the subject may become a branch of ancient history. This volume answers the
question, "Where can one find a book on Constitutional Law that is not too
technical nor too long?" Since the Supreme Court issue has come before the
country many well-meaning citizens have become Constitution conscious, whether

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
for or against "packing." While this book was not written especially to be read
by the above named group, it would be well for the misinformed to do so, as
the work gives the insight to this immortal (?) document, its workings and its
interpretations. Professor Gerstenberg has made a worthy contribution to the
field of Constitutional Law. He has combined the best features of a text book
with those of a case book and has joined them together showing the relation
of one to the other by the aid of footnotes that really serve their purpose.
Although the book is but 717 pages, and the first 277 pages is text, the author
has not treated the subject cavalierly, but by his industry and diligence he has
succeeded in editing a book that will be of much value to the person who
does not have much time to put on the subject, yet who wishes to have a fair
understanding of Constitutional Law.
In the preface the author reminds the reader, "This is a text and case book
for students who have relatively little time to devote to a big subject.' . lHe
also sets forth a plan of study and method of use for this innovating book.
The entire field of Constitutional Law is covered, not exhaustively but adequately
from the historical development to modem trends and theories. Each of the
twenty chapters of text deals with some phase of the Constitution, among which
are such titles as: Interstate Relations, Separation of the Departments of
Government, the judiciary, the Powers to Regulate Commerce, Equal Protection, Due Process and many others. Each chapter of the text has its corresponding chapter of cases most of which are modern decisions. In all there are 67
cases, all of which are leading cases.
Mention must be made of the footnotes which form an integral part of this
volume. Mainly for the purpose of elaboration of the principles set out in the
text, they also point out the applicability and the workability of them. The
footnotes are excerpts from cases, and, well-written, sensible comments from
the author. The notes are definitely not to confuse the reader; neither are they
used merely to fill space or give an authoritative air to the book.
The volume appears to have cost the author many laborious weeks in preparation. It is clear and readable, but not critical and pedantical. This book should
go far in dispersing the appalling ignorance on Constitutional Law that possesses
so many of us. The orderly arrangement of the material and the excellent chapter headings with their numerous sub-titles make it a simple matter to readily
find any particular point dealing with the Constitution. The value of the book
has not been lessened because of the two recent decisions of the Supreme Court,
namely, the Wagner Labor Relations and the Washington Minimum Wage Cases,
as the dissenting opinions in the Adkins case and the Carter Coal Case have
now become law in this country. The latter two cases are discussed fully in
the book.
Anthony W. Brick, Jr.

CAsEs oN CxoIT TRAnSACTrONS. By Wesley A. Sturges. Second Edition. St.
Paul: West Publishing Company. 1936.
This casebook should be highly interesting, not only to the law student but
to the student studying business administration and technique as well, for in
it the author has compiled a study of the cases and materials involving the
frequently recurring transactions whereby parties borrow and lend money and
buy and sell property on credit. The text materials include those credit transactions whereby the parties become involved in the law of suretyship and
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guaranty, contracts of accommodation parties on bills and notes, letters of credit,
real property and chattel mortgages, pledges, conditional sales and trust receipts.
In the average law school one usually finds most of the above subjects taught
as separate courses. The principal materials embraced in these courses have
been combined in this work on credit transactions. The materials are designedly
elementary for it-is not intended to touch upon all, or the more complex, methods
of financing. Curricular, as well as other, considerations necessarily impose these
temporary limitations.
The treatment of each of the types of credit transactions is taken up in an
orderly and intelligent fashion, which gives the student a clear understanding
of the entire transaction. For example, the first chapter is devoted to accommodation contracts. A discussion of the technical contract is taken up first, and
this is followed by the consummation of the credit extension together with the
relations and dealings of the parties during that period. The payment and discharge of the obligation is treated next, followed by extensions and renewals
of the obligation. The time and method of outlawing the obligation, which
involves the Statute of Limitations, is an important phase of the particular
credit transaction. Finally, the author gives us an insight into the problems of
the creditor in proving and having his claim allowed under insolvency and
bankruptcy.
The author follows this mode of discussion in subsequent chapters for each
of the credit transactions, including mortgages, pledges, conditional sales, and
trust receipts. He devotes some space to pointing out the security holder's use
of the credit and security docunients, and the protection and priorities of such
holder. The last chapter of the book explains and illustrates enforcement proceedings and rights to redeem in connection with the different credit documents.
To aid the student in acquiring a better understanding of the different credit
transactions, Professor Sturges has incorporated a limited number of forms
which are in current use. These forms are taken not only from certain private
financing institutions, but from federal agencies as well, including those used
by the Farm Credit Administration, Home Owners' Loan Corporation, and
Resettlement Administration. In the appendices are found the Negotiable Instruments Law, the National Bankruptcy Act, and the -three uniform acts on
real estate mortgages, chattel mortgages, and conditional sales.
Besides its appeal to the student, this book should be very interesting to
the practitioner and business man. The thorough treatment of each of several
different credit transactions should urge one to deal with commercial law in
terms of commercial doings, and to study legal decisions and propositions in
terms of, and with principal emphasis upon, their effects on the business dealings
and practices to which they relate.
James H. Levi.

CASES "Dn MATmArAS
oz TktArz, JuDGxmTs, AND APPAs.Ls. By Thurman
Arnold and Fleming James, Jr. St. Paul: West Publishing Company. 1937.
The West Publishing Company, through Messrs. Arnold and James, presents
here a new type casebook on Trial Practice. This book covers the most frequently occurring procedural problems from the commencement of a case to
the final termination, of it on appeal. It begins with a chapter on the mystical
conception of a. court and ends with a chapter on appeals. On the way it treats
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of the time and place and subject matter of judicial decisions. There is a very
important chapter devoted to the ritual of the commencement of a suit, and
one on venue. Two chapters are given over to executions, garnishment and
attachment, receiverships, creditors bills, liens, supplementary proceedings, and
exemptions. A very interesting and important part of the book is a chapter on
devices for preparation of a case and clarification of the issues involved, which
treats of bills of particulars and motions for certainty, items of negligence and
damages, limitations, arguments, and counter arguments, and discovery and depositions. Then, as the final word on the matter of the trial, there is a chapter
dealing with methods of controlling the jury. This most interesting chapter presents not only the required and accepted methods of selecting the jury and presenting to it the case, but is also a fine lesson in jury psychology.
But the part of the book that students will find most useful and informative
is the introductory notes to each chapter. Here the authors are at their best.
They have lifted out a general proposition from each case, and have delved into
their own experience and that of their colleagues, and have written a note under
each section heading that is a masterpiece of presentation of the law in brief
form. After a few seconds reading of that note, the student can understand
easily the most difficult case in the section, and can relate any case to others in
the chapter as being in support of or dissent from the general rule.
The purpose of the book, which it achieves with consummate ease, is to correlate substantive law and procedure by giving a general, panoramic picture of
the most frequently occurring practical problems which are common to most
kinds of litigation. Apparently because they felt that the subjects could be
treated to better advantage elsewhere, and in order to keep this book at a convenient size, the authors have omitted discussion of problems which primarily
concern pleading and evidence.
Messrs. James and Arnold are to be congratulated on their thorough insight
into the needs of students of law, and without question professors of procedure
will find this casebook a distinct aid in lightening the burden of teaching this
very difficult subject.
A. R. Martin, Jr.

HANDBOOK o0? THE LAW os, Wxus. By Thomas E. Atkinson. St. Paul: West
Publishing Company. 1937.
Every law student in his course of the substantive law of wills should take
cognizance of the fact that at some time early in his career as a young lawyer
a will will be thrust into his hands with directions to proceed until all the beneficiaries have full right and title to the property devised. Stark reality will present many questions. What court has jurisdiction? In petitioning for the probate of a will what allegations should be made? On the date set for hearing what
proof should be offered? If no executor is named in the will who may qualify as
an administrator and what procedure is followed for his appointment? What
should be included in inventory and who should appraise the items listed? These
and many other practical procedural questions relating to the collection, management, distribution, and settlement of an estate are fully discussed and presented in a manner specially adapted to student understanding. Moreover, Professor Atkinson of the University of Missouri has wisely included a chapter on
the rules of construction applicable to wills with many suggestions regarding
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the drafting of wills. Here the importance of clarity and certainty of language,
possible contingencies which may occur in the lifetime of the testator, and an
exact knowledge of the rules of law concerning property inerests are pointed
out. After reading this chapter one is indelibly impressed with the idea that he
cannot be too cautious in drafting a will.
Of the 781 pages of text matter, fully half is devoted to descent and distribution and the procedure of administration. The substantive law of wills is
thoroughly covered in the other half of the book. The chapter on intestacy,
both in England and the United States, merits special comment as presenting a
phase of the law difficult to explain in a concise and lucid manner. Anyone consulting this chapter will find the chart for determining degrees of relationship under the civil law and the canon or common law especially helpful. Throughout
the book, the author has not been content to confine himself to a strict exposition of the law of wills but has generally touched upon other subjects of the
law. A proper delineation of the law of wills includes such subjects as trusts,
taxation, conflict of laws, insurance, and all property law.
Every law student would do well to consult this most recent book written
in the typical and popular hornbook style. The West Publishing Company is to
be praised for their progressiveness in constantly improving and keeping the hornbook series abreast with the most modem developments of the law.
Arthur C. Gregory.

By
=a LAW OF AGENcY.
INDIANA ANNOTAIONS ToTHE RESTATEMTENT OF
Homer Q. Earl and Elton E. Richter. St. Paul: American Law Institute. 1936.
The American Law Institute's plan of restating the general common law of
a particular subject of the law without regard to any single jurisdiction followed
by individual state annotations has been fully realized on the subject of agency
for the State of Indiana. To Professors Homer Q. Earl and Elton E. Richter
of the University of Notre Dame belongs the credit of compiling and annotating
the Indiana decisions and pertinent statutes to the two volumes of the Restatement of Agency. A valuable service has been performed for the Bar of this
State in that it makes the Indiana decisions more readily accessible and the
Restatement more practical to the practicing attorney.
The annotations in this volume are not exhaustive of all the Indiana decisions
on a given rule of law but the compilers have felt that a representative number
of sound, clearly stated, and well-reasoned cases would be far better than to
clutter pages with citations which barely come within the rule stated. Once
given a "lead" any number of cases can easily be found. Comment on the cases
have been interposed wherever it was thought necessary. Cases squarely in accord
or contra with the restatement have been so designated. The sequence of citing
the most recent case frst and then on to the earliest has been adopted because
those recent cases are usually the best cases in stating the principle of law.
This order, however, in many instances has been abandoned and an earlier case
cited first because of a better statement of the rule of law. Accuracy of the
cases cited in relation to the rule stated in the Restatement has been placed
above all else.
These annotations are available to the bar of Indiana in a single bound
volume or in pocket supplement form.
Arthur C. Gregory.
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INDIANA ANNOTATIONS TO THE RESTATEMENT or TB:E LAW Or CONFICr OF
LAWS. Prepared by Kelso Elliott and George E. Palmer of the Indianapolis Bar.
St. Paul: American Law Institute. 1936.
The increasing frequency of citations of the American Law Institute's restatements by courts gives added value and meaning to the state annotations.
Practitioners may save themselves much work and time by using the annotations for at least points of departure in their searches for law.
The Annotations here considered seem particularly valuable due to the enlightening character of the comments on the cases annotated.
Homer Q. E(zr.

McCLiNTOCx ox EQuiT-. By Henry L. McClintock. St. Paul: West Publishing Co. 1937.
This book of 364 pages of text, which came from the press a few months
ago, certainly has no superior, if it has an equal, as a handbook of equity
jurisprudence. It has a table of contents admirably arranged in 24 chapters,
and, in addition, has 20 pages of index from which the searcher may readily
find clear reference to the particular branch of the subject with which he is
immediately concerned. The leading principles of equity are stated with clarity
and brevity. About 2800 adjudicated cases are cited, and the footnotes are
illuminating. To the law student, lawyer or judge, this book seems practically
indispensable. By its use, he may at once ascertain the leading principles; and
examination of other more elaborate texts and adjudicated cases referred to
will aid him in the solution of more abstruse problems. Unlike some highbrow
modernists, the author very properly declares the basis of equity jurisprudence
to be the moral law as administered by the ecclesiastical canonists-who held the
.office of Lord Chancellor up to the time of the reformation, after which the
lay chancellors, habituated to thinking in terms of rationalized natural justice,
carried on the same work on the same basis. Nor does this author scorn as
some do, the well-known maxims of equity which are "terse general statements,
in striking phraseology, which can be retained in the memory." He gives the
list of 11 of these maxims as given by Pomeroy. By some unfortunate oversight, perhaps, one of the most important of these maxims is omitted, viz., Equity
acts in personam. The discussion of these maxims is both intelligent and instructive, as is also the subject of rescission and cancellation of contracts induced
by fraud, and, reformation of contracts entered into by mutual mistake or
mistake on the one part and fraud on the other. But it is not necessary to
mention the adequate treatment of any one branch of the general subject. This
book is a clear, dependable and adequate outline of the whole subject of equity
jurisprudence.
WiMam M. Cain.

RESTATEMENT or THE LAW o PROPERTY. St. Paul: American Law Institute.
1936.
When the American Law Institute set out upon its ambitious task of restating
the general common law of the United States in 1923, it was stated that its object "should not only be to help make certain much that is now uncertain and
to simplify unnecessary complexities, but also to promote those changes which
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will tend better to adapt the laws to the needs of life." No higher or more praiseworthy object was ever expressed by any body which sought the improvement of
the law. Also, perhaps, no legal work has received more praise by those high in
the profession or more publicity than has the Restatement in the short period the
final drafts of eleven volumes on six subjects have been before the legal profession.
Today, generally, that object has become a reality. But despite the high caliber
of the work of the Restatements and the very able men who prepared them there
is one fault which has hindered the wider use and greater influence the Restatement would otherwise exert. This fault, if it may be termed such, appears in the
earlier Restatements and has been perpetuated in the two recent volumes of
Property here reviewed. It consists in the evasive manner adopted in stating a
rule of law. Often, in the statement of a rule of law in bold letter type, reference
is made to prior sections by number as stating the rule; or, again, a rule is
stated subject to the exceptions contained in other sections. Section 64 of the
Restatement of Property is typical:
"Both possessory and future interests in land can be created pursuant
to the rules stated in §§ 59-63 inclusive."
By referring to Section 63, as requested, a rule is stated thus:
"Except to the extent that statutes have limited the purposes for
which trusts may be created, or have restricted the duration for which
trusts may continue, equitable interests in land can be created by the
methods and in accordance with the rules stated in §§ 59-62 inclusive."
Section 62 reads:
"(1) Except in a case described by Subsection (2), an estate of one
of the kinds dealt with in this Chapter (fee simple conditional, or fee tail,
or an estate or estates substituted by a modern statute for a fee tail) is
created in favor of issue of the life tenant, by an otherwise effective conveyance which
(a) contains a limitation of an estate for life; and
(b) contains further language purporting to create an estate in the
same land either in favor of the conveyor, or his heirs, or in favor
of some third person limited upon the death of all or of a designated class of the issue of the life tenant.
"(2) When the 'facts stated in Subsection (1) creates a situation to
which the Rule in Shelley's Case applies (§ 60), the consequences of the
transaction are not included in the rule stated in this Section."
Of course, Sections 59, 60, and 61 must be read for a complete statement of
the rule as enunciated in Section 64. But the above sections are quoted as illustrating a bad feature which should be and could be eliminated from all future
Restatements. Such sections are unnecessarily confusing, difficult, and irksome to
read. While the import of those sections may be clear to those writing the Restatement, it is not so readily clear to others. Law students particularly object to
using the Restatements for this reason and as a result a certain respect is lost
for them. Such a manner of stating a rule presumes that one will read a Restatement from cover to cover and ponder over each rule, but in most instances
references are hurriedly made only for a particular rule of law which might be
quoted as authoritative. We prefer a repetition of the rule and thus have something definitb and tangible that can be readily understood and quoted verbatim
rather than to have such an indefinite and evasive manner of stating a rule of
law. We think the involved style of the Restatements has been a distinct hinderance to their wider use among law students.
Volume I, entitled "Introduction and Freehold Estates," covers definitions of
general terms and terms relating to estates, and a discussion of estates in fee
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simple absolute, estates in fee simple defeasible, estates tail, estates in fee simple
conditional, and finally estates for life.
Volume II is entitled "Future Interests Parts I and II." Part I differentiates
future interests from other property interests. Part II takes up the characteristics
of future interests and treats of their transferability by conveyance inter vivos,
succession on death, subjection to the satisfaction of claims of creditors, and
partition and judicially ordered sales. Consideration is also given to the protection
of future interests as against act and omissions of the owner of the present interest, protection of future interests as against acts and omissions of persons
other than the owner of the present interest, protection of future interests as
affected by statutes of limitations and the doctrine of prescription, and finally the
termination of an interest as affecting succeeding interests.
Although other volumes on property covering easements and profits and the
remainder of future interests are in preparation, these two volumes on property
are in themselves complete with the usual detailed and thorough Restatement
index. In this Restatement one's attention is drawn to an appendix in each volume
which contain certain monographs which are stated "to apply to sections in
which the rule of law stated is contrary to an impression believed to be widely
entertained by the profession." These monographs are most interesting and instructive. Moreover, as much of the law of property has been modified by
modern statutes, the American Law Institute has wisely adopted .the policy in
this Restatement of citing state statutes to a number of sections. This is a highly commendable addition.
While many eminent authorities in the field of property law have assisted in
the preparation of these two volumes, special mention should be made of the
Reporters who shouldered much of the work. Mr. Harry A. Bigelow, of Chicago
University, during his term of approximately two years submitted the first three
chapters. Upon his resignation Mr. Richard R. Powell, of Columbia University,
was elected Reporter and has held that position throughout the preparation of
these two volumes. Mr. W. Barton Leach, of Harvard University, has acted in
the capacity of Special Reporter.
Arthur C. Gregory.

TH ANwuJAL INDEX or LEGAL PmRODwnCAXS (August 1, 1935, to July 31, 1936).
Published by Current Legal Thought.
To aid adequate research and yet appease many students of the law, who,
along with the rest of the people of this country, have been swayed by the attitude to hurriedly accomplish any purpose, The Annual Index to Legal Periodicals
has answered the request for facilities for those who want to keep abreast with
current legal periodicals. This topical index, brief and concise, thoroughly surveys
law reviews of many foreign jurisdictions as well as all reviews of this country.
Only in this way could the articles of all these publications be retained for future
use. Bold-faced type topic titles classify the articles that have appeared not only
in Current Legal Thought, but also, more important, any subject of any character which has been presented in thest reviews. The specific title of the article
along with a citation of the exact edition of the review in which it was printed
concludes the particular comprehensive index. Therefore as a key and guide to the
latest legal thought its value is exceptional.
John DeMots.
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PowER. By Morris L. Ernst. New York: Doubleday, Doran &

This book of 326 pages seems to have left the author's hands in November,
1936, and to have come from the press in 1937. The only importance of this fact
*is that, since the first named date, the Supreme Court has sustained the validity
of the Washington Child Labor Act and the Wagner Act. Since these impressive
decisions would hardly have influenced the author's major thesis which is that
the legislative and executive power should be made absolute and supreme, and
the judicial power subordinate and subservient thereto. He makes this clear in
his considered suggestion of a suitable amendment to the Constitution to effect
this change, the amendment to provide that Congress, by a two-thirds vote,
could override a decision of the Supreme Court upon any constitutional question.
He claims this would be a modification of Madison's proposal that "in case both
the President and the Supreme Court veto an act, a three-fourths vote of Congress would be required to override these dual vetoes." Transference of the
power to protect and enforce the guaranties in the Bill of Rights from the
Supreme Court to Congress, the author seems to think is the only thing necessary to admit us all into an economic paradise.
The approach to discussion of this question is distinctly hostile. The Convention of 1787 is assailed as not being representative of the people, of consisting
of "rich men" selected to protect the "propertied classes." At the time when delegates were being elected to the several state conventions, to vote upon the newly
drafted Constitution, a property qualification was necessary to suffrage in all
states except New York which had manhood suffrage. Yet the vote in New York
was little different from that in the other states, the author saying it was
thought that the patroons could control the votes of their servants.
In the introduction to this book, we find these somewhat startling words:
"But the jurists, sitting like ancient witch doctors, remote from the mines and
the farms, with words no layman and few barristers can fathom, held back the
tides of potential prosperity and well-being for all our people." By these words,
the author introduces the villian of his piece,--the treacherous coterie who have
"held back the tides of prosperity for all our people." None other than our
Supreme CourtI It is a little curious that no one has discovered this sinister fact
before. Others, including Theodore Roosevelt,-whom he quotes,--and Alfred M.
Landon have advocated the "recall of judicial decisions" by the people who would
know nothing of the evidence, the arguments or the law and would have had
to vote for reversal or affirmance by "blind reckoning." But, as far as I am informed, no one up to this time has made this serious charge against our Supreme Court. And yet this author says of our present Supreme Court: "In ability,
erudition and tenacity, these nine jurists surpass the highest bench in any state
court, and are collectively superior to any group of' men ever sitting on the
Supreme Court bench during the century and a half of its existence." What a
pity that men so magnificently endowed should prostitute their talents to blocking the road to prosperity for 130 million peoplel It is a comforting reflection
that no one, outside certain institutions, will believe ft.
This author claims that he is a lawyer, but seems to have a robust grudge
against his own profession, for, when speaking of the 76 lawyers who have been
*judges of the Supreme Court (p. 296) he says: "We must remember these men
are lawyers. They belong to a profession which has always been basically dishonest... . Judges, as lawyers, were of necessity double dealers." Twenty-eight
delegates to the Convention were lawyers, who took a leading part in forming
our Constitution. Still the author does not hesitate to quote from these "basically
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dishonest, double-dealing" men to sustain his contentions on questions of fact.
The truth is that without lawyers no constitution would have been drafted or
adopted, and there would have been no Nation.
Some idea of the moderation and fairness of this book may be had from the
language used to state a decision of the Court,--apparently the New York
Minimum Wage decision,-where we find the author saying: "The SupremeCourt of the United States, however, ruled that girls must go back to work
at five dollars a week. So the Court, as a court, wrote a prescription for the
women of the land,-a prescription of hunger, want and disease." With equal
moderation of expression, we may suppose that the Court's decision in the
Washington Child Labor case would be reported thus: "So the Court wrote a
guaranty for the women of the land that, henceforth, they would live in luxurious
idleness with every want munificently supplied and in complete immunity from
disease!"
Chapter IX, "The Founding Fathers," contains brief biographical sketches
of tht active 55 delegates to the Convention. Most of them are derogatory, the
possession of wealth being suggested as a distinct qualification, besides the 28
members of the "basically dishonest profession" of the law. Of George Washington, whose memory most of us still revere, the author's sketch begins thus:
"Educated by a local sexton, married to 15,000 acres, 30,000 francs, and several
hundred slaves."
In many ways, the author seeks to discredit the Convention, the differences
of opinion expressed by the delegates as to the powers of the Supreme Court,
carefully omitting to state what the Convention agreed upon and the people
approved in these words: "The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law
and equity, arising under the 'Constitution," etc. (Italics are mine.) The fact
that the Convention transcended the purpose of the call for it, which was merely to "revise the Articles of Confederation," is also mentioned. Why this trivial
circumstance should be referred to does not appear, unless further to discredit
the work of the Convention and to show that the delegates seized the opportunity to make their own holdings of government securities worth par. It is
hardly to be imagined that a member of even a "profession basically dishonest"
would claim that all interests acquired in reliance upon the validity of the Constitution should forfeit all their holdings with a Communistic grab-bag merely
because the work of the delegates exceeded the limits of the Annapolis call
therefor. No objection on that score was made in the Convention, and, it would
seem, in words that even a layman can understand that the adoption by the
people of the work of the delegates would cure any defect in the call; and
that, after the lapse of 158 years, it is a trifle late to raise the question. The
tendency of the whole book is to afford "parlor communists" material for arguing
that, from the very beginning to the present moment, everything that has been
done in our America has been wrong.
The author's comments on the Bill of Rights contained in the first ten amendments are interesting, and, also, misleading. The provision in the First Amendment that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 'freedom of speech or
of the press," it is claimed has been repeatedly violated. Despite this amendment,
it is stated that all through the Coolidge-Hoover administration "newspapers of
left wing economics were denied the mails." In 1936, in Arkansas and California,
"as two outstanding examples," the right of peaceful assemblage was denied, and,
in many states, citizens have been convicted while peacefully petitioning the
government for redress of grievance. It would be interesting to know just when
and where these outrages occurred. Was it in New Jersey or Illinois where the
assemblage "peaceful petitioners" did it by occupying legislative halls, day and
night and excluding the elected legislators?
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For a moment, let us return to the claim that the constitutional guaranty
of "freedom of the press" was outrageously disregarded by denying the mails to
newspapers containing articles on what is euphemistically called "left wing
economics." First of all, it is to be remembered that there never has been any such
thing as absolute unconditional "liberty or freedom" of the press or of any
person. Every "liberty" has been limited by the principle that one person's
liberty ends when its exercise would deprive another of his liberty. All philosophers, all jurists, and all men of plain common sense have been in accord on
this principle for centuries. And yet this author complains of the Supreme Court
because "The judges carved a piece out of Liberty and called it License." There
is "liberty of speech and the press," but if you take the words literally and falsely charge your neighbor with some heinous offense, you may have a libel or
slander suit on your hands and the constitutional guaranty will not be a defense. If, depending upon "the precise and certain" words of this First Amendment, which the author suggests could not now be written with "greater clarity,".
you publish "sexually exciting literature," you will find yourself, convicted for
violating an act of Congress putting a ban on the circulation of such literature
for interstate shipment. And another hideous outrage on your constitutional
"freedom of the press" will have been violated, evoking howls of anguish from
the prisoner and his friends. In sustaining the Act of Congress the Supreme
Court said, as a reason for its decision, "Anything libidinous or lewd or indecent
would corrupt the people of the land." But this author, mark well, says, "To
a nonlawyer a free press, as referred to in the amendment, implies the disseminatLion .of such literature, but Congress limited the First Amendment, and the Supreme Court acceded to the limitation." So, in this instance, neither the Supreme Court nor Congress nor even both combined meets. the favor of this
author. This is the first time this writer has ever heard of this "freedom of the
press" guaranty justifying the interstate dissemination of obscene, sexually exciting, foul and vile literature. By a parity of reasoning, detailed pointed instructions for the scientific commission of murder, robbery, kidnaping or rape
could not be forbidden circulation. And, if the Government may lawfully prohibit the circulation of literature which "would corrupt the people of the land,"
can it not, also, enact a similar prohibition against literature which tends to
the destruction of the Nation itself? In countries under the control of Communism, the howlers for "liberty" here would be dumb,-"and like it."
The Fifth Amendment engages the apparently serious attention of the author.
The parts of that Amendment which he claims have been denied, or which he
criticises, follow: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . .
nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." (Italics are mine.) Admonishing us to "read it carefully" and aVoid
being "bewildered by the fact that it is called law," he proceeds to blunder on
the first of the above quoted provisions relating to indictment and Grand Jury.
He says, "You are entitled to a grand jury hearing before being tried for certain
crimes,--those punishable by capital punishment and other infamous crimes."
Flatly, this is untrue. No defendant or prospective defendant is entitled to any
"hearing" before a grand jury. Proceedings before a grand jury are ez parte
and secret. It is merely an accusing not a trial jury, and never pronounces upon
the guilt or innocence of anybody. Neither defendant nor his counsel is entitled
to be present, let alone having a "hearing" before any grand jury. All this body
may lawfully do adverse to defendant is to make two findings: (a) that a felony
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has been committed, and (b) that there is probable cause to believe that the
defendant committed the crime. If these are found in the affirmative, a "True
Bill" is returned into court which requires that the defendant be tried. Observing
the admonition of the author to "read it carefully," where are the words giving
defendant any right to a "hearing" before a grand jury? On page 200 he says,
"Comparatively few people sent to jail today are indicted by a (grand) juryeven though the sentences they are serving run for long years." Literally, standing alone and unexplained, this statement is partly true; but when the whole
story is told, the statement is wholly untrue. Many states have adopted the procedure of prosecution by "information" as a substitute for "indictment" and a
preliminary hearing before a magistrate to determine the fact of the commission
of a felony and the probable guilt of the defendant as a substitute for inquiry
and return of an indictment by a grand jury. The Supreme Court of the United
States in the case of Hurtado,v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 4 Sup. Ct. 111 (1884),
held that this form of procedure when adopted by a state was lawful, and that
all rights of the defendant were fully accorded to him. In all states where this
form of procedure has been adopted, it may truthfully be said that convicts are
serving long terms who have never been "indicted," though they have been
"informed" against. It is generally believed, by those in position to know, that
prosecutions by grand jury indictment are archaic, ineffective, expensive and, in
general, a nuisance. Committees appointed to investigate this subject during the
past 40 years have all reported against it. On the other hand, criminals and
those who always sympathize with them favor the retention of the grand jury
system,--it affords such a splendid opportunity for the political underworld to
"work on" the grand jurors during its frequent intermissions.
Commenting on that provision against self-incrimination contained in this
Fifth Amendment, our author says: "You need not testify against yourself.'?
Many court decisions, however, have approved confessions induced by the third
"degree." To this, I reply that no court has approved confessions induced by the
third degree. Many courts, it is true, have "approved confessions" which the
defendant claimed were "induced by the third degree." When an arrested suspect who has made a confession of guilt, gets a criminal, who has been admitted
to the bar, to defend him, and tells this criminal lawyer that he has made a confession, he learns for the first time that it was extorted from him "by the third
degree." When on trial, he testifies to the various brutalities that were inflicted
on him by the police so as to annul his confession. Evidence is then produced by
the state tending to show that his whole story is false and that his confession
was entirely voluntary. This, of course, raises an issue of fact, the question being which side is lying. Sometimes this question is presented to the jury, and
sometimes the court alone decides it. If the jury finds the defendant guilty, or
necessarily must find that the confession was voluntary, this finding is usually
binding on the court and so he "approves it," as he must, unless the verdict of
guilty is clearly wrong.
One of the trickiest statements in the book, relates to the provision that
"private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."
Then, in discussing what is "just compensation," this author says: "When a
city buys land for playgrounds or parks, due process demands, so the Courts
say, that a much larger sum be paid than the amount the landowner claimd
it was worth when the city assessed the same land for tax purposes." Everyone
knows that when a landowner states the value of his land "for tax purposes,"
he, almost invariably, fixes that value at very rsuc*h less than its true value so
as to escape payment of as much tax as possible. And yet the author says in regard to the attempt of the courts to ascertain the true value, as opposed to the
fictitious value, "On such legal legerdemain, the city slums remain intact and
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new housing, so sorely needed, is unobtainable." It might be retributive justice
in a condemnation case to compel the landowner to accept in payment for his
land taken, the exact sum. which he himself declared it was worth when the assessor inquired, but the Constitution says "just compensation."
Going to the matter of trial by jury, the author says: "More people are in
jails of the land today, having been tried by judges without jurors, than by
judges and jurors." Nobody knows with the slightest degree of certainty whether
this statement is true or not. Perhaps it is, but, if so, it can be accounted for in
several ways. In metropolitan areas, usually a great deal of "bargaining" takes
place between the defendant and the prosecutor, the defendant offering to plead
guilty to an offense of lesser degree if the prosecutor will charge a crime of less
gravity. In case an agreement is reached, the defendant pleads guilty, and, of
course, there is no jury trial. Then in certain states, the defendant may elect to
be tried by the judge alone, and waives his right to trial by jury. But, possibly,
by far the greater number who are "in the jails of the land today" without jury
trial are those who were charged only with misdemeanors which are triable to
a magistrate without a jury. No constitutional provision is violated by this procedure, since the word "crime" now has a different signification than it had in
1787.
The author claims that bail of $350,000 in case of a racketeer in New York
was recently required, and that it was "excessive." In other words, he complains
that a racketeer, handling, perhaps, millions, was unable to buy his way out of
the clutches of the law. He does not name this racketeer. It may have been
Luciano, Head of the Vice Ring in New York, engaged in the sale of women.
If it was Luciano, then no amount of bail necessary to hold the defendant for
trial would have been "excessive."
The book, as a whole, is an attack on both the Supreme Cotirt and the Constitution. Various suggestions are made for taking from the Court its power to
hold legislative acts void. One-device suggested is that Congress may repeal its
former acts giving the Court power to review cases involving validity of legislative acts.
By the new constitution adopted in Russia last November, supreme power
legislative, executive and judicial is lodged in their bi-cameral congress, formed
something like our own only more numerous. Members of either house are selected by universal suffrage of all persons over 18 years old. It is intended to be
strictly a proletarian congress. But it has supreme power. There is no court to
block the streams of prosperity for all. Congress not only enacts laws but dictates
how these laws shall be interpreted and enforced.
The author wants our Congress to participate in considering whether its own
acts are valid, thereby falling into the common error that a multiplication of
stupidities will finally result in wisdom.
Very appropriately, this book is dedicated to Heywood Broun, the columnist,
"who asked for it," and it may aid Broun in his socialistic endeavors.
Wirlam M. Cain.

